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ABSTPACT
With a neutral tax system an increase in observed and anticipated
inflation would not be expected to alter either real after—tax yields
on bonds and equities or the ratio of the market value of equities to
the replacement cost of corporate real capital. In the real world,
however, declines in real after—tax bond yields and the relative value
of shares have been observed. Feldstein (1976, 1978) hasattributed
both of these phenonema to the use of historic—cost depreciation,and
-
thetaxation of nominal capital gains. Our analysis supports his conjecture
regarding the decline in real after—tax debt yields, but rejects his analysis
of the cause of the decline in share values.
The decline in share values can be attributed to many factors, but
the most important is probably the favorable taxation of income from
owner—occupied housing (no taxation of either implicit rents nor real
capital gains). As a result housing has become more attractive with the
acceleration of inflation, and households have substituted housing for
equity shares. Other possible sources of the decline in share values are
reduced profitability of existing capital, owing to increased regulatory
costs and real energy prices, and a greater perceived risk in business
operations.
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THE DECLINE IN AGGREGATE SHAREVALUES:INFLATION ANDTAXATION
OF THE RETURNS FROM EQUITIES ANDOWNER—OCCUPIED HOUSING*
The past dozen years have been disasterousfor the value of
common stocks in the United States.In spite of a near doubling of the
price level, the aggregate valueof publicly—traded equity shares was no
greater at the end of 1977 than atthe end of 1968; share values had
fallen by 40 percent relative to the replacementcost of corporate real
assets) Little agreement exists regarding the cause of this
collapse.
Feldsteifl (1978) argues that biases in the taxlaw impair equity values
during inflationary periods.Malkiel (1979) denies this and attributes
the decline in valuation to an increasein the perceived riskiness of
investment in equities vis—a—vis investmentin bonds. Others might
contend that a basic decline in the pretaxprofitability of the existing
capital stock has occurred, but Feldsteinand Malkiel would appear to dis-
agree with this contention.
The analysis of the present paper suggeststhe following. While
the use of historic—cost depreciationin the calculation of corporate
tax liabilities and the taxation ofnominal capital gains do tend to
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1The share value data are from U.S. Federal Reserve System(1978).
Von Furstenberg'S (1977, Table 1) measureof Tobin's q fell from 1.0 in1967—
1968 to 0.7 at the end of 1976. Becausedebt has been a roughly constant one—
quarter of the replacement costof real assets, this is tantamount to a40
percent decline in the valueof equities relative to the replacementcost of
real assets [(1.0—0.7)10.751. Feldstein(1978) provides alternative data
supporting the 40 percent decline.—2—
reduce equity values during inflationary periods, these same factors
cause real after—tax debt yields to fall in response to increases in
expected inflation. This tends to raise actual equity returns (share-
holders gain at the expense of debtors) and to lower required equity
yields, the combination of which increases in share prices. On net,
there is no reason to expect that share values should have beennegatively
affected. In contrast, there is evidence that equities have declined in
attractiveness vis—a—vis bonds and that the pretax profitability of the
existing capital stock has fallen. Each of these phenomena has contributed
to the decline in share values.
Owing to the relationships among debt and equity yields and the
market value of equities, a first step in deducing the impact of changes
in anticipated inflation on share values is to determine the impact of
inflation on debt and equity yields. This is the subject of Section I.
The impact of increases in expected inflation on share prices, when
historic cost depreciation is required and nominal capital gains are taxed,
is examined in Section II. The merits of alternative explanations of the
decline in share values are evaluated in Section III. Asuary con-
cludes the paper.—3—
I The ImpactIofIflation on Debt andquity Yields
Twofundamentalrelationships are involved in the determination
of debt and equity yields. The first is an investment—equilibrium
condition whereby the marginal product of capital equals an average of
the real costs of debt and equity financing. The second is a portfolio
balance condition in which the after—tax risk—adjusted returns to investors
on debt and equity are equated.These relationships are the subjects
of parts A and B of this section. The impact of changes in inflation is
deduced and illustrated graphically in parts C and D.
A.Investment and the User Cost of Capital
As is well known, the decision to invest depends on whether the
present value of the expected revenue from investment, net of direct
operating expenses and indirect taxes, exceeds the supply price of capital,
and on marginal investments the two will be equal. Assume that inflation
is expected to cause net revenues to rise at rate ir(profit margins are
constant) and that the productivity of the investment and thus real net
revenues are expected to decline at the output decay rate of per year.
In the absense of taxes one can then write:
tlv p = , (1.1) k
t=l (l+r)t
where =currentsupply price of capital
REV=currentexpected net revenue (operating income), and








The left side of equation (1.2) is the gross marginal product of capital
required for a firm to purchase a new capital good.
If one allows for the taxation of business income at rate T and
business capital at Tand for differences between tax and economic
depreciation and if capital goods prices are expected to rise at the same
rate as revenues, then the analogue to equation (1.2) is:










p is the marginal product of capital net of both depreciation and taxes;
ra is an average of the after—tax debt, (1—T)i, and equity, e, rates,
with c being the debt weight; and * is the average annual geometric
rate of tax depreciation when Sx is the tax depreciation rate allowed
in period t.If tax depreciation were equal to economic depreciation
at replacement cost, then =(l+_S)t.Substituting this expression
into equation (1.6) yields CS* =S.However, under present tax law
2 . t—l
depreciation is based on historic cost,i.e., cSx =6(1—5)
2Present law allows the use of accelerated depreciation methods
which reduces business tax liabilities. The impact of accelerated depreci-
ation methods, the investment tax credit, and low tax rates on the first
$100,000 of corporate profits will be captured by the assumption below that
T =0.4rather than a higher number.—5—





B. After—Tax Yeid and Portfolio Equilibrium
It is assumed that dividend and interest income are taxed at rate
y and capital gains income at rate c (c<y). Specification of the return
on equities after personal taxes thus requires an assumption regarding
dividend policy. Before inflation accelerated in the second half of the
l960s, nonfinancial corporations paid out slightly less than half of their
true earnings after taxes (recorded earnings with the IVA and capital
consumption adjustments). In 1964 and 1965, for example, the payout ratio
was 43 percent. In the 1970s, the payout ratio, so measured, jumped sharply.
In 1976 and 1977, for example, the ratio was 64 percent.. A plausible
explanation for the higher payout is that firms view the real gains that
accrue to shareholders when inflation erodes the real indebtedness of the
firm as ttdistributable" earnings.. To subtract debt payments based on an
inflationary premium in interest rates in the calculation of earnings but
not to add the reduction in real indebtedness is inappropriate [von Furstenberg
and Malkiel (1977)]. When the reduction in real indebtedness, TrcPkK (where
K is the real capital stock and the actual and expected inflation rates
are equal), is added to true earnings to obtain distributable earnings, the
payout ratios in 1964—65 and 1976—77 become, respectively, 41 percent and
43 percent.3 A constant fraction y of earnings so—calculated is assumed
3These calculations are basedupon ci. =0.25, rr 0.012 in 1964—65
and 0.065 in 1976—77, and the values of real assets reported in von Furstenberg
[1977, Table 1, column (2)]. Von Furstenberg's data also indicate that the
ratio of the market value of debt to the value of real assets has remained
close to 0.25 throughout the 1952—76 period.—6—
tobe paid out.
To see precisely what is involved, it is useful to rewrite equation
(1.3), after substitution from equation (1.5), as
e = 1
[p ct(l—T)i —T(_*)+ car] + TT. (1.3')
The first term is the expected real pretax return, inclusive of the real
gains at the expense of debtors, to shareholders, y of which is assumed to
be paid out as dividends and taxed at rate y. The remainder plus Ttis
taxed at rate c. Thus, the expected after—tax return to shareholders is:
ea =(l—y)y(e.-ii)+(1—c)[(1.-y)(e—1T) + Tr]
=(l—y')(e—ir)+ (l—c)Tr, (1.7)
where y' =yy+ c(1—'y) and equals y when all real earnings are fully
taxed (l). A neutral tax system would tax all real equity earnings
(e—11) at rate y and would not tax inflationary gains at all. Thus the
present system is biased in favor of equity returns when inflation is low
and against these returns when inflation is high.4
The expected after—tax nominal return on equity equals the expected
after—tax return on bonds plus a risk premium:
ea (1—y)i + , (1.8)
where > 0 is the risk premium.
4For c =y/5and y'=0.4,the system is biased in favor of
equity returns as long as r < 2.4 (e—Tr)orabout 12% when the real after—
tax yield is 5%. For a discussion of why the concurrent equivalent capital
gains tax rate would fall far short of the statutory rate, see Bailey (1969).—7—
C. Combining the Relationships




[ir - - —j e. (IE)
Substituting (1.7) into (1.8) and solving for i gives portfolio
equilibrium (PE):
I =-—e+ ir—_c._. (FE) l—y l—y l—y
Differentiating (PE) with respect to
=-- + -c
(1 9)
dir l—y dir l—y
Differentiating (IE) with respect to ii,allowing for the dependency of
on irreflected in equation (l.6a),5
di —_____ 1—ctdc
(1 10)
dir ct(1—T) ct(1—T) dir'
(r+S)[r+ S(1—T)}
where X = — unlessreplacement—cost depreciation




51n these differentiations, both p/rand/Tr are assumed
to equal zero. See Section III.B for an argument that /ir>0.
61f /Tr,thenthe second term in the numerator o (1.10')
becomes (1—ct)(y'—c--),—8—
This expression reduces to 1/(1—T) a' la' Feldstein (1976) or
l/(l—y) as in Darby (1975) when
(1) A =1(replacement—cost depreciation exists)
(ii) 1and thus Y' =y(all real earnings are fully taxed)
(iii) c =0(nominal capital gains are not taxed)
(iv) y =T(interest is taxed and deducted at the same rate).
Under these conditions the real after—tax debt rate, (l—y)i if,would
be invarient with respect to rr.
Equating (1.9) and (1.10) and solving
de= (l—y)?c(l—T)(y'—c)
(1 9')
dir cL(1—T)(1—y') + (l—cL)(l—y)
When conditions (i)—(lv) hold, this expression reduces to unity and
the real after—tax equity yield, (1—y)(e—rr), would be invarient with
respect to ir.
Of course, conditions (i)—(iv) do not hold in the real world.
Table 1 contains estimates of di/drr and de/dir for different values of y.
The other assumed parameter values are also listed in the table; thera
and ir values necessary for calculating A are approximate average values
for the 1964—77 period, not current values [see Hendershott and Ru (1980)].
As can be seen, the hypothesized parameters yield derivatives that are well
below those that would exist under a neutral tax system. To illustrate,
with a neutral system and y =0.4,di/dir =1.67and de/d'rr =1.0.
The calculated values are dijdir =1.28and de/dir0.81 or roughly
20 percent less.7 These results support Feldstein's conjecture (1976, p. 816,
7L /T 0.3 (sea Section III.B), then the calculated value of
di/dir would be 0.88 for y =0.4and 0.64 for y.= 0.0. Data from the ps,t
decade and a half suggest that corporate bond rates: have risen by slightly
less than the increase in expected inflation.—9—
Table 1: Calculated Changes in Debt and Equity







Underlying Assumed Parameter Values:
ra =0.092, =0.085,it=0.035,T=0.,4and thus 0.8.
y =0.4,c =0.2y,and thus y' =O.52y. =0.25..—10—
note 15) that the taxation of nominal capital gains and the use of historic—
cost depreciation are the cause of the decline in real after—tax debt yields
during the last decade and a half. The results are not, however, compatible
with the analysis of Feldstein, Green and Sheshinshi (FGS, l978).8
D. A Graphical Illustration
The impact of an increase, in. expected inflation on nominal debt
and equity yields under both a neutral tax system [as defined by conditions
(i)—(iv)j and the present system is illustrated in Figure 1. The nega-
tively—sloped solid schedule is the. IE curve when the anticipated inflation
rate is initially zero(Tr° =0).The positively—sloped solid schedule is
the corresponding FE curve. From the IE and FE equations, respectively,
the slopes of these schedules can be seen to be —(1—a)! a(l—T) and
(l—y')/.(l—y). With no expected inflation (and thus S=6*), the vertical
intercepts are p/a(l—T)and—/(l—y), respectively. The intersection of
the curves gives the initial yields of i° and e0.
In a neutral system, an increase in 'rrto ir' would raise the IE
schedule by iT'/a(l—T) and the FE schedule by yrrT/(l—y). The new dashed
schedules intersect at i' =i0 + iT"/(l—y) and e' =e0+jr and the
real after—tax rates of return are unchanged. Firms can afford to pay these
8FGS deduce [equ (28) aftercorrecting for an error in the substitution
from equ (27] that
di=Ty + (l—y) (X—T)
dTr
WithA =0.8and T =0.4,the values for the derivative with y =0.0,0.2
and 0.4, respectively, are 1.33, 1.0 and 0.67. Note that the derivative
increases, rather than decreases, with y. A major source of the difference
in analysis, including the surprising ab.sencc.of c from the expression for
di/diT, is that FGS do not employ a portfolio equilibrium relationship.Nominal
DebtYield
Figure 1: The Impact of an Increase in Expected
Inflation on Debt and Equity Yields Under Both
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higher nominal returns on the same quantities of debt and equity, and wealth—
holders are willing to supply the same amount of debt and equity capital
as before.
The existence of historic—cost depreciation in the face of inflation
erodes some after—tax real earnings of firms by raising the effective
corporate tax rate. Given p, firms cannot afford to pay i0 + Tr°/(l—y)
to debtors and e0 + .110toshareholders. Thus the IE curve rises by only
[n' —T(_S*)]/c(1_T)to the dotted schedule in Figure 1. The shift in
the PE curve under present tax law is more complex. The taxation of nominal
capital gains makes equities less attractive during an inflationary period,
requiring higher relative before—tax yields on equities and thus tending to
shift the dashed PE schedule rightward (to lower the vertical intercept). The
only partial (y) taxation of real gains, on the, other hand, makes
equities more attractive (with or without inflation), requiring higher
relative before—tax rates. The net result of an increase in inflation
is a slight bias against equities.9 Thus current methods of taxing equity
income at both the firm and personal levels act to mitigate the increase
in debt yields that would otherwise occur in response to an increase in
expected inflation.
9When X =1.0,the value of de/dir for y =T=0.4is 1.11 > 1.0,
indicating that the PE curve shifts rightward along the dashed IE schedule
(the value of di/dir is 1.56 < 1.67).—13—
II.Inflation, Corporate Taxation and the Market Value of Equities
The after—tax expected rate of return on equity is the expected
rate of return on a unit of real capital divided by the fraction of
capital that is equity financed. For new capital, one solves equation
(1.3') for e—Tr and substitutes in equation (1.8):
ea =(1_y')[p_T($_S*)_ct(l_-r)i+ cti] -1-(l'-c)(l—ct)ir
(2.1)
By definition, the market value of equity that finances marginal new
investments is 1—ct times the value of the investment, and the value
of new shares nd debt equals the replacement cost of the new real
capital. The determination of the market value of existing equity requires
consideration of the average return on existing capital.
The expected rate of return on existing shares, which must equal
the rate of return on new shares, can be expressed as the product of the
after—tax average return on a unit of real capital and the value of
real capital PkK, divided by the value of existing shares, Mv.
Thatis,




where!thats!t on the variables denote values pertaining to existing, rather
than new, real capital (old and new capital are assumed to be taxed
identically and financed with the same proportions of debt and equity).
Substituting (2.2) into (1.8) and solving for MV/PkK
=(1-y')[-
(2 3) (l—y)i+To deduce the impact of increases in observed and expected
inflation on the value of equities relative to the replacement cost of
real capital, one takes the derivative with respect to ii:
=(l_yT)_l—T)-4+ all + (l—c)(l—ct)—
thr
(l—y)i +
Assuming that was initially equal to 1—ct,as it was in the middle
l960s, for an increase in inflation to reduce relative share values
(d/thr < 0) it must be that
1),t —a(l—T)---+ < (l—y). —(1—c). (2.4)
Consideration of the values of di/thr computed in Table 1, along with
the y and c associated with them, establishes that the right side
of (2.4) is negative. While somewhat more complicated to demonstrate,
the left side is also postiie. As a result, (2.4) does
not hold and thus an increase in inflation should raise relative share
values, not lower them.
Before establishing that the left side of (2.4) is positive, it
should be noted that the left side would be negative in a model where
firms are fully equity-financed (ctO) because dSfdir < 0. It is the
pure—equity assumption of Feldstein's analysis (1978) that allows
him to reach the conclusion that inflation impairs equity values. When
debt—financing is acknowledged, it is clear that the combination of
increased inflation and the present taxation of corporate income will
not, ceteris paribus, be detrimental to share values.—15—
Theleft side of (2.4) will be positive if
Td15* idi 1 + —— —(l—T)-—-—>0. (2.4') cdrr idir
Thederivatives 1/i and d5*/thr are average "concurrent equivalents"
because their values depend on the time elasped from the change in Tr
and it is the average changes in i and cS*, in present value terms,
that are relevant to the current value of shares. To illustrate, in 1977
only 14 percent of net interest—bearing debt of nonfinancial corporations
was short—term.1° Thus an increase in interest rates would apply
initially to less than a fifth of outstanding debt (in the short run
i/i < 0.2). Over time more debt would roll over at the higher interest
rate and eventually i/i would approach unity. In the calculations
reported in the next session, the average concurrent equivalent i/Bi
will assumed to be 0.4. This would make the last term on the left of (2.4')
equal to —0.3 for the maximum value of di/thr of 1.28 and T =0.4.
The expost understatement of depreciation allowances in any period
due to inflation and the use of historic—cost depreciation, UN =(ScS*)(PkK)l,
can be approximated by
UN =
(Pk_Pk)SGINV1 + (k_Pk )5(l—S)GINV2 + (Pk_Pk )6(l—5)2GINV3 +
10Total net interest—bearing debt is defined as credit market
instruments outstanding plus trade debt less nonmonetary liquid assets and
consumer and trade credit holdings. Net short—term interest—bearing debt
is defined as total net interest—bearing debt less bonds and mortgages
outstanding. Total net debt equalled $577.1 billion at the end of 1977 and
net short—term debt was $81.7 billion; the ratio of the latter to the former
was 0.138, up from 0.106 at the end of 1967.[The data are from U. S.
Federal Reserve System (1978)].—16—





Multiplying the right side by k 'k substituting the definition of
-l —l
UN and letting APk/Pk equal IT,thisexpression can be written as
—l
PkK -i
and the one—period response. of *to is simply —(S.
Overtime, the understatement of depreciation allowances will
increase as the price level continues to rise. The long—run impact of an
increase in inflation on cS*is obtained by using the steady—state
relationship that UN =(l+ii+g)UN1,where g is the rate of growth in




(S (l-i - [1+ + g = O483
or It= 0.035,g =O.Q3and (S =0.085.The average concurrent
equivalent value of d*/dIt is taken to be —0.3. With (S =0.085and
T= 0,4,the second term on the left of (2.4') is thus —0.48. The
inequality is thus satisfjed,, and anincreasejn inflation, ceteris
pat-ibus, should raise the relative value of shares.—17—
III. Other Causes of the Decline in Share Values
The question still remains as to why share prices have fallen. Only
two possible sources exist within the framework developed: a decline in
the pretax net return on capital, p, and an increase in the risk premium
required to induce investors to hold equities, .Significantevidence
exists that each of these changes has occurred; whether the changes are
large enough to explain the observed decline in share values is another
matter.
A.Some Empir-cai Evidence
Malkiel (1979) is most closely identified with the position that
has increased. In support of his hypothesis, he computes a series on the
expected return on stocks and compares it with the return on riskiess
long—term treasury securities,. The expected return series is an imagina-
tive use of expected growth rates of earnings per share, obtained from the
Value Line Investment Survey, for each of the companies in the Dow Jones
Industrial average., According to Malkiel's calculations, the premium rose—18—
from under roughly 3½ percent in the 1964—65 period to 6 percent in the
1975—77 period.11 Independent equity returns calculated by Hendershott and
Hu (1980) show a roughly 3½ percentage point rise from 4 to 7½ in this
premium.
There is also evidence that the pretax return on capital has fallen
in the 1970s. Feldstein and Summers (1977) compute cyclically—adjusted
pretax series [p/(l—T)] based on two different capital stock measures.
The declines in the pretax series between 1964—65 and 1975—76 are 3 and
2 percentage points. Moreover, the 1975—76 data were adjusted upward on
the basis of the potential GNP gap as measured in 1976. Two downward
revisions in potential GNP have been made since then [Council of Economic
Advisors (1979, pp. 72—76)]. As a result, the gap in 1975—76 is now cal-
culated to be only 70 percent of the gap employed in the Feldstein'-
Summer's adjustment. Using the lower gap reduces the adjusted values
of the series in 1975—76 by one half to a full percentage point.
This would constitute 4 and 2½ percentage point declines in the two series
between 1964—65 and 1975—76.
Some calculations are presented in Table 2 to indicate the impact of
changes in inflation, pretax profitability, and the risk premium on the
market value of equities. The assumed parameter values common to all
calculations are listed below the table. The values that vary [Tr,p/(1—T), and ],
the calculated ratio of share values to the replacement cost of real capital
11Malkiel computes risk premia for both equities and bonds by sub-
tracting a risk—free treasury yield series. Unfortunately, the treasury
yield series employed was the infamous average yield on all treasury securities
with maturity over 10 years. Because this series contains primarily deep
discount and "flower" bonds, the quoted before—tax yield was consistently
between 3/4 and 1½ percentage points less than a new—issue equivalent yield
throughout the 1968—76 period [Cook and Hendershott (1978)].—19—
Table 2: The Impact of an Increase in Inflation, a Decline in the
Pretax Return on Capital, and an Increase in the Risk Premium'
____ p/(l—T) ______ ____
(1) 0.00 0.11 Q.O446" 0.75 0
(2) 0.07 0.11 O.044.6 0.824 +10
(3) 0.07 0.11 0.0796 0.651 -13 (—21)1
(4) 0.07 0.075 0.0446 0.682 —9(—17)
(5) 0.07 0.075 0.0796 0.539 —28 (—35)
(6) 0.00 0.075 0.0796 0.331 —56
at y =0.2,c =O.2y,y 0.4 and thus y'O1O4. Also, ct =0.25,
T=0.4,i0.035 + 0.4 (1.05) ii,and_*= 0.3ff,where 0.4 =
1.05=di/drr(frOm Table 1 when y= 0.2), and 0.3= d*/jç.
b/ Obtained by solving equation (2.3) assuming i0.035 when TF=0
and =1—c=0.75.
Cl The numbers in parentheses are calculated as (— 0,824)10.824.Thus
these calculations refer to the ceteris paribus impact of an increase
in or decline in pl(l—T), given a 7% inflation rate.—20—
(), and the percentage change in share prices (%) are listed in the
table. All calculations are obtained by solving equation (2.3). Row (1)
indicates the value of in a noninflationary world given p/(l—T)0.11.12
Row (2) illustrates the positive ceteris paribus impact that an increase
in inflation should have on share prices. An increase inTFfromzero to
7 percent should raise share prices by 10 percent relative to the replace-
ment cost of real capital)3 Row (3) shows that a 3½ percentage point
increase in the risk premium from 0.0446 to 0.0796, in conjunction with
the increase in inflation to 7 percent, lowers share values by 13 percent.
Row (4) indicates that a decline in the pretax return on capital from 0.11
to 0.075, again in conjunction with the rise in inflation, reduces share
values by 9 percent. When these changes are combined, row (5), the re-
duction in share values is 28 percent, or over two—thirds of the 40percent
observed decline. Row (6) measures the impact of an increase in the risk
premium and a decline in pretax profitability in the absence of inflation,,
The 56 percentage point decline in share values reemphasizes the earlier
point that biases in the tax code against corporate income have not caused
the decline in equity values. Given the increase, in the risk premium and
decline in pretax profitabi1ity share: values would have fallen even more
if inflation had not accelerated.
12Thjs is consistentwith Feldstein and Summers (1977), after allowing
for property taxes, and Hendershott and Hu (1980).
estimate is not sensitive to the assumed values of the personal
tax rate. For example, with y =0.0,would be 0.823rather than 0.824. If
the actAul inflation rate exceeded the expected rate during the adjustment,
then c1S*/d7Tcould exceed its long—run value. This appears to have been the
case in the United States [HerAdershott and Hu (1980)]. With the average con-
current equivalent value of d*/r set at —0 5 rather than —0 3,in rows
(2) and (5), respectively,would be 0.786 and 0.509.—21—
B. Causes of the increase In and Decline in p
Malkiel (1979) cites three reasons for the increase in the relative
risk premium required on equities: (1) the recessions of 1969—70 and
especially 1973—75, after eight years of Continuous prosperity, (2) the
greater variability in prices associated with a higher level of inflation,
and (3) escalating uncertain business regulation. One might question the
importance of (1), it depending on a questionable naivete of investors,
and possibly (2). While uncertain inflation obviously creates uncertainty
regarding the real after—tax return on equity investments, such returns
are at least partially hedged by the underlying real assets. The real
after—tax return on investments in long—term debt instruments, in contrast,
is not hedged at all [Gordon and Halpern (1976)]. While uncertainties
regarding business regulations have undoubtedly increased, it seems un-
likely that they could explain the remarkably large increase in .
Anotherargument against Malkiel's explanation is the failure of
other market measures of corporate risk to increase dramatically. Malkiel
reports a spread between yields on BAA corporate bonds and long—term
treasury securities, and the spread rises sharply from 1 percentage points
or less in the first half of thel96Os to2:to3 perdaxtgepoints in the
1970—76 period (although it falls below 2 percent in 1977). However, this
increase is largely attributable to the inclusion of deep—discount bonds in
the issues underlying the average treasury yield series (see footnote 11).
When a new—issue—equivalent treasury yield series is substituted for the
deep—discount series, the yield spread exceeds 2 percent in only the
severe 1974—75 recession years and barely exceeds 1 percent in 1973 and
1977.—22—
A better explanation for the increase in is the impact of
increases in inflation on the attractiveness of investment in owner—
occupied housing [Hendershott and Hu (1979)]. During the past decade
and a half, leveraged homeowners have earned expost real rates of return
on the equity invested in their homes averaging 5 percentage points
greater than expected. Moreover, neither the implicit rents nor the real
capital gains on housing are taxed, while returns on financial assets are
and interest payments are deductible in computing the personal income tax
base. As a result of this tax treatment, the increase in expected inS—
flation has lowered substantially the user cost of capital for owner'-
occupied housing for those in higher tax brackets. The decline between
1964 and 1978 has been estimated to be 2½ percentage points for those in
the 30 percent marginal tax bracket and 4 percentage points for those in
the, 45 percent bracket.
Because investment in owner—occupied housing is more faoedby
tax law during inflationary periods, it is not surprising that households
have substituted housing investment for purchases of equities. Rather than
channelling current income into equity mutual funds, this, income is bei:ng used to
make mortgage payments. In order to maintain a balance in portfolios
between "real" (shares and real estate) and debt investments, bond holdings
have been maintained. The result is the observed increase in the premium
required to hold shares vis—a—vis debt.
Turning to the causes of the decline in the pretax profitability of
the existing capital stock, two seem relevant. First is the sharp increase
in regulatory costs. These include those generated by environmental
14
standards, health and safety programs,, and affirmative action programs.
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See Crandell (1978, pp. 417—426) for estimates of some of these costs.—23—
Unless these costs can be fully passed onto consumers, i.e., labor
absorbs the full costs via reduced real wages, the return on existing
capital would decline. Second is the sharp rise in energy prices in the
1970s relative to that expected when the capital was put into place. This
has required expenditures to render production processes more energy
efficient and the resultant processes are probably still inferior
relative to those associated with new capital.,
C. Implications for Empirical Investigation of Investment Behavior
Tobin's "q" theory makes the ratio of the market value of the firm
to the replacement cost of its real assets a central determinant of investment
behavior [Tobin and Brainard (1977)]. When q >1.0,net investment will
raise the value of shares; when q <1.0,investment will lower the value
of shares. The relevant q is a nonobservable anticipated marginal ratio:
the increase in the market value of the firm owing to investment in real
assets divided by the value of the additional real assets. However, if
marginal and average q's move together, the latter equalling+ a in
the symbolism of this paper, then the observed +ais an adequate proxy
for the marginal q and can successfully be employed in empirical work.
As long as deviations of + a from unity are largely caused by
the business cycle, q and + a are likely to move together. During
recessions, when excess capacity exists and + a <1.0,new investment
is unlikely to be profitable (q <1.0);the reverse is true during expansions.
Of course, if this is the case, then capacity utilization rates would pro-
vide as accurate an explanation of investment behavior as would + a—24—
[von Furstenberg (1977)]. However when + afalls owing to a decline
in cyclically—adjusted p/(1 — + a and q could diverge sub-
stantially. New capital will be more productive than old capital because
only the former will be energy and environment efficient. In this case,
capacity utilization rates would be preferred, empirically,to+ a. On
the other hand, when + a falls owing to an increase in ,then + a
would be preferred empirically to capacity utilization rates.
IV. Summary
With a neutral tax system an increase in observed and anticipated
inflation would not be expected to alter either real after—tax yields
on bonds and equities or the ratio of the market value of equities to
the replacement cost of corporate real capital. In the real world,
however, declines in real after—tax bond yields and the relative value
of shares have been observed. Feldstein (1976) (1978) has attributed
both of these phenomenon to the use of replacement—cost depreciation and
the taxation of nominal capital gains., Ou analysis supports his conjecture
regarding the decline in real after-tax debt yields, but rejects his analysis
of the cause of the decline in share values.
The decline in share values can be attributed to many factors, but
the most important is probably the favorable taxation of income from
owner—occupied housing rather than the unfavorable taxation of corporate
income. Neither implicit rents nor real capital gains on housing are
taxed, and mortgage interest is deductible in computing the personal income
tax base. As a result housing has become more attractive with the accel-
eration of inflation, and househqlds have, substituted equity
shares. Other possible sources of the decline in share values are reduced—25—
profitability of existing capital, owing to increased regulatory costs
and real energy prices, and a greater perceived risk in business
operations.
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